
          Black Boss: Political Revolution in a Georgia
County
          By Hanks, Lawrence J.Lawrence J. Hanks
          Vol. 5, No. 1, 1983, pp. 16-18
          
          Black Boss: Political Revolution in a Georgia
County. John Rozier. The University of Georgia Press,
1982.
          John Rozier's Black Boss is a narrative of John
McCown of Hancock County, Georgia and the political revolution that
most observers felt reached fruition in 1968, the year that blacks
became the majority of members of the county commission. Rozier, a
Hancock native, deserves to be commended for bringing the county to
the attention of scholars as well as a general audience. It has been
fourteen years since blacks ascended to political power, yet the
political science journals have yet to publish any analysis of the
political changes in Hancock. Thus, Black Boss breaks
new ground.
          On leave from his post as Public Information Services director at
Emory University, Rozier manages to do a thorough job of research. He
interviewed numerous black and white Hancock citizens; he combed
through the newspapers that covered the stories; he searched the files
of the Georgia Council on Human Relations; and he examined the
transcripts from the pretrial hearings and other documents relating to
the trials that were held. Rozier had sufficient information to give
his readers a balanced story of John McCown and the political
revolution in Hancock. The book's strength is its wealth of
material.
          Unfortunately, there is a serious problem with Black
Boss. The book has a blatant bias against McCown that
permeates the work and inhibits the author's ability to view the
political, social, and economic dynamics. While Rozier concentrates
solely on the character of McCown, the changes that McCown stirred to
life are more important historically than the man himself.
          Although Rozier acknowledges the "widely varying views" concerning
McCown in his preface, he proceeds to use the negative appraisals of
him as the central focus of the book. He never acknowledges, perhaps
he does not realize, that he is telling one side of an extremely
controversial story. McCown, with his charismatic, unorthodox, and
noncompromising style, came to Hancock in 1966 as a seasoned civil
rights activist. He led the first civil rights march in Colorado
Springs, Colorado, protesting the injustices in the armed forces. He
later worked with CORE, SNCC, and the Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO) in Savannah. While affiliated with SCLC in Atlanta, he saw the
potential for black political empowerment in Hancock and decided to
move himself and his family there. His childhood in Loris, South
Carolina, and his adolescence in Harlem taught him that only the bold,
aggressive, and self-assured survived. These qualities became an
integral part of his personality.
          Hancock County was fertile soil for McCown to test his theory of
black self-help through political participation. A devout believer in
democratic theory, he emphasized the accountability of elected
officials to their constituents. Moreover, he felt that political
power and economic power were flip sides of the same coin--one could
not expect to make changes in either of these areas without
simultaneously working in both arenas. He took this message to homes,
bars, street corners, and churches. Armed with charisma and expertise
in federal regulations, McCown won the confidence of many Hancock
blacks by showing them that white county officials could be
successfully challenged when they denied blacks benefits that they
were entitled to receive. One person could make a
difference. Moreover, that one person, when organized with others,
could make substantial changes. This is the legacy of McCown which
Rozier totally neglects.
          McCown organized the Eastern Central Committee for Opportunity
(ECCO), a community development corporation, in 1970. By 1974, after
having received approximately 5.5 million in private and federal aid,
ECCO had established itself as the center of economic development in
Hancock County. Blacks held every elective or appointive position in
the county except sheriff and tax commissioner. In their attempt to
salvage whatever political power they could, segments of the white
community appear to have participated in many activities that Rozier
chose to ignore or treat lightly: "white flight" into Sparta and
gerrymandering were two methods used to maintain white political
dominance; the Klan demonstrated on the eve of the 1966 election; the
broodstock at the ECCO fish farm was mysteriously poisoned; the
concrete block plant was vandalized; there was a white boycott of ECCO
fish farm products; death threats were directed towards McCown and
other black elected officials; the harassment of ECCO employees by law
enforcement officers was commonplace; the ECCO threatre was burned;
and, IRS and FBI agents were illegally used to gather information for
the federal grand jury. Moreover, the white communities in neighboring
counties gave assistance in trying to thwart the movement: they
supplied political contributions; black drivers from Hancock were
routinely cited for violations while passing through; and on at least
one occasion, a group of "night riders" entered the county to pay the
ECCO headquarters a visit.
          Much of this white reaction was due to the considerable amount of
political and economic power that the black community was
gaining. Until the school desegregation squabbles of 1969 and 1970, a
small portion of the white community supported ECCO. After the
attempts to desegregate the school however, even this support
disappeared. The battle lines were drawn--the white community was
determined to get rid of ECCO and McCown, while most blacks were
determined to protect both. A good number of citizens, both black and
white, carried guns at all times. For the remainder of the McCown Era,
there would be at least two versions to practically everything that
happened.
          After almost four years of concerted effort to discredit ECCO and
McCown, events began to favor those opposed to ECCO. The Atlanta
Constitution ran a series of 

articles (June 30, 1974 -
July 4, 1974) which seriously questioned the legitimacy of McCown and
the ECCO enterprises; this series had been preceded by a similar
series in the Macon Telegraph. These two series,
combined with years of letter writing and public pressure for an
external audit of ECCO, prompted the Washington office of OEO to
conduct the long desired audit. On July 24, 1974 Senator Nunn's office
issued a press release stating that the General Accounting Office had
briefed Senator Nunn telling him that "their initial report indicates
that the OEO external audit will show substantial discrepancies." As a
result, a federal grand jury investigation of McCown and ECCO was
initiated, contributions came to a halt, and after eighteen months of
a federal grand jury investigation--five guilty pleas to fraudulent
use of federal poverty funds ended the economic phase of the political
movement in Hancock. The man that Hancock whites wanted to convict
most, John McCown, was killed in a plane crash in January 1976. Thus,
the "McCown Era" ended with both sides unsatisfied. The anti-McCown
group had wanted McCown to stand trial while the pro-McCown group felt
that they had no alternative to pleading guilty.
          In Black Boss, Rozier has shaped his first two
chapters, "Hancock County" and "John McCown," in a manner which
prejudices readers thinking about the political movement in
Hancock. First Hancock is portrayed as an unlikely place for a
political revolution: Hancock's early leaders were Whigs and Unionists
who opposed succession although they favored slavery; slaveholders
treated their slaves well; the county had no record of lynchings;
blacks could buy land more easily and they led the state in the number
of black farm owners; and, "Hancock was noted for good race relations
until the troubles of the 1960's." Then in chapter two, McCown is
portrayed as a moral degenerate accused of a wide variety of acts:
lying, stealing, "shacking up" with a German woman, having bad credit,
contributing to the delinquency of minors, and rape. The picture has
been painted clearly: an immoral degenerate comes to peaceful,
idyllic, racially harmonious Hancock County and upsets the balance. In
both instances, Rozier overstates the case.
          Although race relations in Hancock were reputed to be relatively
good, the credit for this state of affairs should not be contributed
entirely to the good will of whites. With an overwhelming black
population, blacks in Hancock have a history of assertion. Although
the historical antecedent is obscure, present day blacks in Hancock
recount many stories about blacks from slavery to the present who
challenged the authority of whites, demanded respect, and fought in
the defense of rights. Conditions were not as peaceful as Rozier would
have us believe.
          Rozier's attempt to point out McCown's alleged moral weaknesses
point to a major weakness in the book--the trustworthiness of
anonymous sources. Moreover, much of the nonflattering information
about McCown, e.g., his speeding tickets, his "shacking up" are simply
nongermane to his role in the movement towards black politcal and
economic empowerment in Hancock. In his attempt to cast a negative
shadow on McCown and the political revolution in Hancock, Rozier
undermines the conclusions he reaches by his willingness to raise
gossip to the status of fact. Although McCown was posthumously
indicted, of course he was never tried--his case was never presented
in court. Rozier writes as if McCown's assumed guilt is a proven
fact. His bias is most blatant when he has the opportunity to decide
who is telling the truth between McCown and some other
party. Illustrative of this is his treatment of the "arms race"
incident and the burning of the Clinch House.
          The "arms race" occurred in 1971 after several years of
tension. After hearing frequent shooting in the night, Mayor Patterson
of Sparta, the county seat of Hancock, decided that McCown and his
followers were practicing for a battle with the white citizens of
Sparta. He ordered ten machine guns for his two man police
force. After McCown and the other county commissioners learned of the
purchase, they felt that the black citizens of the county needed to be
protected from the whites in the city. They immediately ordered thirty
machine guns. The arms build-up continued until Governor Jimmy Carter
intervened. He convinced them both to dispose of their
weapons. Although Rozier offers no concrete evidence that McCown or
his followers were actually the source of the shooting, he writes
under the assumption that McCown started the "arms race."
          The Clinch House, an antebellum mansion, was burned while McCown
was jailed during a disturbance in 

May of 1974. The house had been
recently refurbished by the Hancock County Foundation for Historical
Preservation; "the refurbished home was preserved as a reminder of the
county's past . . ." When the house went down in flames, the mayor
accused 'McCown's followers of burning it. Since most of ECCO's
employees were guarding his jail cell, this was unlikely. In turn,
McCown accused the mayor of "knowing something about the fire." Once
more, without offering a shred of concrete evidence, Rozier accepts
the anti-McCown version as fact.
          Rozier criticizes the Thames Production Company, a British film
company, for bias in their film on the county; he also criticizes the
New Republic for not being balanced in their March 6,
1971 article on the events of the county: "the point of view of the
McCown faction was accepted without question." It is ironic that he
falls prey to his own criticism in reverse--he accepts without
question the perspective of the anti-McCown faction.
          The successful efforts for political empowerment in Hancock were
the source of local as well as national pride. Between 1966 and 1976,
theory progressed to reality as blacks won every county office except
sheriff. The stage was now set to see whether or not political power
could be transformed to economic power. The major accomplishments of
black political empowerment were symbolic, social, and psychological
until McCown became active. During the McCown era, the accomplishments
of the county government were becoming more practical as ECCO was
expanding to offer more jobs through the skillful gaining of
foundation and federal funds. Black I economic independence was
becoming a reality and political participation became less of a threat
to the livelihood of black Hancock citizens. After his death and the
demise of ECCO, the benefits of black empowerment were reduced to the
symbolic, social, and psychological although blacks presently hold the
same number of offices. Although it has not yet happened in Hancock,
black constituents usually grow accustomed to these nontangible
benefits and grow apathetic if the black elected officials cannot
convince industries to locate in the county to provide jobs.
          The veterans of the civil rights movement greatly overemphasized
the power of the ballot to make changes. Although the Voting Rights
Act freed blacks from legal barriers to voting, it did not remove the
threat of economic intimidation. McCown realized that the black vote
would never reach its full potential as long as blacks were subject to
economic intimidation. Because McCown operated on this premise,
Hancock, for a brief period, served as a national model for black
political mobilization, especially in the Black-Belt South. Rozier's
failure to critically examine the merits of this philosophy seriously
diminishes the value of Black Boss.
          
            Lawrence J. Hanks is a graduate student in government at
Harvard University. He is presently studying Hancock County as part of
his dissertation on black political participation in the rural South
since the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
          
        