
          The Race Toward Reapportionment
          By StaffStaff
          Vol. 4, No. 3, 1982, pp. 18-24
          
          Billboards and television commercials of earnest faces and subdued
colors are inviting many Southerners already to think about the
virtues of candidates for the November elections. Back in the halls of
the state capitols in almost half the Southern states, however,
politicians face the prospects of computer runs, cross-examinations,
and twilight negotiations in order to draw the lines that will decide
what are the congressional and state legislative districts for the
fall.
          Because of the delay in the final redistricting, especially in the
Deep South, the federal courts will be deciding in the next few weeks
if they must order special redistricting plans in order to assure that
elections go forward later this year. White state officials have been
quick to lay the blame for the failure to produce a reapportionment
plan on the courts or the U.S. Justice Department. "The bureaucrats in
Washington," is a phrase that begins many private conversations
throughout the region in legislative chambers and state election
offices. One state official in North Carolina sounded more like a
former governor of Mississippi when he called the decision of the
Justice Department to object to a North Carolina reapportionment plan
"obscene and asinine."
          Black state legislators in the South see it another way. State
Representative Jerome Tucker said of the rejection of Alabama's plan
in early May: "I anticipated the plan would be rejected. I look at it
as a failure of the Alabama legislature to reapportion itself fairly."
In Georgia, where the state decided to appeal a Justice Department
decision disapproving of its congressional plan, State Rep. Billy
Randall of Macon, chairman of the Legislative Black Caucus, said that
the delay in holding primary elections could have been avoided if the
state had been willing to correct the mistakes which Justice
identified.
          While reapportionment is the politics of pencils, calculators, and
computer printouts, it is also at bottom the process by which
fundamental changes are made in the distribution of political power,
and individual political fortunes rise and fall according to the lines
that are drawn. This democratic exercise presents more convincing
evidence that in Southern politics race as an issue remains king. The
examples of relentless opposition to creating any district that permit
black voters to have a powerful voice in electing representatives is
staggering when added together from across the South.
          In Virginia, the General Assembly met more than three times in
special session considering dozens of reapportionment plans over
twelve months before it was forced to permit three additional black
majority general assembly districts. Of a total of 140 members, black
voters will control at most the election of only seven delegates to
the legislature for the next decade.
          The North Carolina legislature also convened in three special
sessions to adopt four redistricting plans before it decided it must
add three districts where blacks may be able to control the elections
for representatives to the general assembly. In February, the North
Carolina legislature refused to create anything more than a fifty-one
percent majority-black district in the face of advice from its lawyers
and the state research officer that the plan was unlawful and that
another special session would be required. Their lawyer advised them
to add four or five percentage points to one senate district to forego
another round of reapportionment. Yet, five more percentage points of
black population in one northeastern district was too much for the
general assembly to do willingly.
          In South Carolina, the all-white state senate has held off
redistricting in the hopes that Congress would weaken the Voting
Rights Act and thus the pressures to draw districts that will give
black voters a chance to elect at least one state senator. In
neighboring Georgia, state lawyers are appealing a ruling that its
plan for congressional redistricting was discriminatory in the face of
verified comments from the chief opponent of a majority black
congressional district that he would not permit "a nigger
district."
          For several days in May in Alabama the state legislature ran the
high risk of jeopardizing its entire reapportionment plan by reducing
one rural south Alabama district from sixty-five to sixty percent
black because the incumbent white legislator said that he simply could
not get elected with that many blacks in his district.
          In Mississippi, the legislature turned away efforts to have a
majority-black district in one of five congressional seats in a state
where almost two of five are black. In Louisiana, the governor vetoed
a majority-black congres-

sional district that the legislature had first
adopted, and then the legislature turned around in the redistricting
of its own houses and reduced by one-third the number of
majority-black legislative districts in New Orleans despite a rise in
the percentage of blacks in that part of the state.
          In Florida, Texas, and Tennessee--all states receiving additional
congressional seats for the 1980s--the state legislatures refused to
give serious consideration to creating districts with a majority of
black or Hispanic population.
          If the expenses of lawyers and special sessions of the legislatures
were added into the cost of holding some of the special primaries that
may be required, the price of doggedly opposing black influence in
Southern reapportionment may reach as high as five million dollars
before the last penny is spent in 1982. It's an intimidating cost,
especially in these days of shrinking state budgets.
          Although these facts merely highlight the systematic efforts to
retard black voting strength, white Democrats continue to debunk
reapportionment as only a tool for Republicans who are using blacks to
front for their partisan gains. Also, some white politicians truly
believe that it is bad politics for blacks' own self interests to
concentrate their influence as a majority of voters in a limited
number of legislative districts when they could make up a
substantial--but not a majority--percentage of several more
districts.
          Both arguments ignore the continuing existence of racial "bloc"
voting throughout the South. In a recent study in Mississippi, for
example, one political statistician found that almost ninety percent
of the white voters m the state in local elections will vote only for
white candidates and that a very large percentage has a pattern of
voting only for white candidates who are not allied with black
organizations. In such circumstances, which are not unusual throughout
the South in most local elections, black voters often must have a
controlling vote if they are to have a meaningful voice.
          Because the number of legislators elected by black. votes continues
to be very limited, the Voting Rights Act and the
U.S. Constitution--more than political horsetrading--remain the major
protections for the rights of black voters. The Act provides that
jurisdictions in six Southern states and forty counties in North
Carolina must file with the U.S. Department of Justice any change in
voting before that change is implemented. These changes, including
redistricting, are examined by Justice to decide if they will have a
discriminatory effect or purpose. If so, the changes cannot be
implemented.
          A local or state government covered under this pre-clearance
provision may appeal to the federal district court in Washington where
a panel of three judges is convened to hear the case. In turn, black
citizens are also able to file suit in local Southern federal courts
if they believe that redistricting plans violate the
U.S. Constitution.
          In the following summaries of most Southern states, a few case
studies are presented in order to illustrate the anatomy of
reapportionment in the region, as it has developed recently.
          
            Alabama
          
          In perhaps its most comprehensive objection to a state
reapportionment plan to date, the Justice Department rejected the
Alabama Legislature's proposals in early May. Justice found that
Alabama had diluted black voting strength in Birmingham, Mobile, and
all urban areas "with current black populations of over twenty-five
percent and in the rural Black Belt counties."
          The decision set in motion a month of backroom politics and agile
legal efforts to keep the federal courts out of Alabama
redistricting.
          In Birmingham, the proposed plan reduced the number of districts
with majority-black populations from seven to six. It also reduced the
influence of black voters in one of the remaining six districts
despite an increase in the percentage of the black population in those
parts of the metropolitan area. In Mobile and Montgomery, Justice
found that the state used almost contradictory means of redistricting
in order to dilute in both places the voting strength of blacks in
senate districts. The redistricting of the Black Belt also evidenced
voting discrimination since Justice found that the legislature had
shaved off the percentage of blacks in order to reduce from five to
one the number of house districts with a majority of blacks of voting
age. Even in the one remaining district the majority of voting-age
blacks was reduced somewhat.
          Word of Justice's actions spread quickly among state political
leaders in Montgomery but reaction was comparatively mild in a capital
where an Alabama governor in past years had suggested after an adverse
federal court decision that the judge ought to have a "barbed wire
enema." Tempered by the experience of the last fight in Alabama over
reapportionment, which brought a court order tripling the number of
majority-black legislative districts, the cochairman of the
reapportionment committee and probably next year's speaker of the
house, veteran state Rep. Rick Manley, moved quickly to figure out the
minimal changes in the original plan that Justice would approve and
his colleagues would accept.
          Manley realized that a three judge federal panel sat in the
background and might step in to take over reapportionment in Alabama
if a plan was not adopted that could get Justice's approval in time
for candidates to file for primary elections in September. On that
court, convened because of a suit by black legislators and citizens,
was Frank Johnson, the judge who had ordered the sweeping
reapportionment in the 1970s; Myron Thompson, a black appointee of the
Carter administration who once worked for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
and the National Education Association: and Truman Hobbs, a
conservative who had nonetheless supported the wing of the state
democratic party that opposed George Wallace in times past.
          As a white Black Belt politician, Manley was especially concerned
about reshaping his own district, presently sixty-two percent black,
and others in that part of rural, south Alabama. Birmingham also
presented a major political problem since any remedy of Justice's
objections 

would probably mean running two or more white incumbents
against one another. Indeed, to keep the court out of reapportionment,
Manley had to orchestrate the drafting and adoption of the legislative
plan that would affect more than twenty legislative districts and that
could be approved by Justice by early June.
          Meeting and telephone calls began to multiply. Manley and lawyers
for the state met with Justice officials in Washington one day during
the week of May 7 and the next day were back in Montgomery for a
meeting with lawyers for the black plaintiffs challenging the
reapportionment in federal court. Apparently, Manley told Justice,
legislators and the plaintiffs' lawyers that he was open for any
suggestions and implied that he had no new plan in mind. Therefore, he
would be willing to let them help shape any new plan for the
legislature. It was a useful--if not entirely truthful--strategy since
it kept his white colleagues believing that they would not be betrayed
and told the black legislators that they might be able to get what
they really wanted from him. In truth, Manley had statisticians and
computers devising several options in Birmingham, the Black Belt, and
Mobile, where he thought the major problems lay. When the special
session was convened on Monday, May 24th, Manley had worked out his
plan.
          In the new plan, the percentage of blacks in the majority of black
senate districts in Mobile was increased, as were the numbers of
voting-age blacks in the Black Belt house districts. Further, the
Manley plan created one additional majority-black house district in
Birmingham and pitted two white incumbents in the same house
district. Although white legislators in Birmingham grumbled and blacks
realized that the proposals failed to meet all their concerns, the
plan actually jeopardized the political future of no more than five
white incumbents and did increase the number of majority-black
districts.
          Manley was taking no chances in permitting opposition to build too
quickly. Claiming computer problems, Manley's reapportionment
committee withheld the details of the plan from most legislators until
the session was already underway. These convenient "technical"
problems kept the endangered legislators from rallying support around
specific changes and added pressure on the other legislators to adopt
the plan and go home. The alternative, Manley kept reminding them in
public and in private, was to fail to pass a plan and turn the job
over to Justice and the federal courts.
          While not visible in the map-drawing, speaker of the house Joe
McCorquodale also wanted a quick, tidy session. A declared candidate
for governor, McCorquodale didn't want to open himself up to charges
of wasting taxpayers' money on long, expensive special sessions that
didn't accomplish anything. Also, while not wanting to offend black
legislators whom he was still courting, he certainly did not want any
hand in twisting the arms of white legislators from the Black Belt
where he resides and whom he'll depend on in the November election.
          In the first day of the session Manley and his cochairman Lister
Hill Proctor claimed that no amendment could be made to their plan if
it was to be approved by Justice. Black legislators countered that the
plan had to be amended to do more in protecting the voting strength of
blacks if it was to pass muster at Justice. Supporting their view,
black state Sen. Michael Figures presented an alternative plan that
would create additional black majority senate districts in Montgomery
and the Black Belt while increasing the black population in five house
districts in the Black Belt--including Manley's own district. Other
black leaders also voiced disappointment with Manley's plan at a
public hearing on Tuesday, May 25th. Wendell Paris of Sumter County
said that the Black Belt house districts were "gerrymandered to make
it so black people can't be elected."
          Leaving nothing to chance, Manley quickly had the Figures plan
analyzed and circulated a list to his colleagues showing that a rather
large number of incumbents would be pitted against one
another. Manley's analysis created a stir even in the Legislative
Black Caucus since it showed that the Figures plan, due to a mistake
in the computer tabulation, placed two incumbent black legislators
from Mobile in the same district.
          Despite the attraction of the Manley-Proctor plan to most
legislators, who would after all remain unharmed by the proposal,
Manley was unable to hold all of his white colleagues in line. Black
Belt state representative Leigh Peg ~es, who had defeated his black
opponent by less than 250 votes in the last election, successfully
convinced the house to reduce the black percentage in his district in
the Manley plan from 65.9 percent black to 60.4 percent. In debate,
Manley warned his colleagues once more that the change would
jeopardize the whole plan and let the federal courts determine what
everyone's district lines would be. But, whites in the House were
moved by Pegues' emotional reminder: "I can't win with 65.9 percent
blacks in my district." After his plea, they approved Pegues'
amendments and the Manley plan over the objection of blacks.
          That Wednesday night, Manley apparently decided that he should
begin to court the black legislators' support for a plan that gave
them something in return for accepting Pegues' needs somehow. If the
House kept Pegues' changes, the plan might get through Justice if it
had the support of all black legislators. Since the senate had
followed Proctor's instructions and passed the exact Manley plan,
Manley circulated a proposal to black legislators that gave them
something in the senate. First he assured some of the members of the
Black Caucus that Pegues' amendments would not stand precisely as they
were. But, if the Caucus could live with a little less in the Black
Belt, he would be willing to place into his own plan a majority-black
senate district in Montgomery. The offer was tempting and caused
spirited debate. Some Caucus members thought that Justice disapproval
of a plan without a substantial black majority district in Montgomery
was a sure thing. So there was nothing to negotiate over. Others had
doubts.
          As the Caucus considered its political and legal strategies, Manley
and Proctor were busy polling senators on their reaction to possible
changes in the senate districts which an agreement with the Caucus
might cause. They were also conferring with state's attorneys about
the Justice Department lawyers' inclinations on the different
options. Apparently, news from both lines of inquiry indicated that
the Pegues' amendments would kill the pla[unclear] Justice and that most white senators
weren't willing to add another black majority district to make up for
short-

comings in the Black Belt.
          According to one lobbyist in Montgomery, McCorquodale was in fact
responsible for the initial success of the Pegues' amendments. He
refused to persuade Pegues to l accede to the Manley plan in fear that
Pegues would desert his gubernatorial campaign. In absence of Speaker
McCorquodale's strong arm, Pegues could not be brought in line.
          Unable to pressure Pegues or to get agreements, Manley called the
Caucus late Wednesday night and withdrew his proposal. "It won't fly,"
Manley said. No longer considering a compromise, the Caucus
unanimously decided to oppose any plan that didn't remove the Pegues'
amendments and did not create a substantial majority-black senate
district in Montgomery and the Black Belt.
          Manley's impasse was broken when Pegues agreed in a Wednesday
twilight conversation, that if given an opportunity to present his
case for a sixty percent majority-black district directly to the
Justice Department, he would not jeopardize the whole legislative plan
for the sake of "fairness to me" if Justice rejected his
proposal. With that promise, a complicated arrangement was then
designed with the cooperation of McCorquodale and Governor Fob
James.
          The plan called for the house judiciary committee--which Manley
chairs--to take up the senate-approved, original Manley plan on
Thursday, May 27. It would be reported to the house floor on
Friday. This procedural move was necessary since Manley didn't want to
ask house members to override directly their own vote to approve
Pegues' amendments. After all, legislators have their pride. The
strategy also allowed Manley to keep the issue clear and simple: the
house should vote only once to approve the full plan and vote against
all amendments including those from disgruntled white and black
legislators. In this way, Manley thought he could cast the actions of
the house before Justice as a good faith effort to meet it's
objections while turning away "excessive" proposals from both white
and black legislators.
          To satisfy Pegues, Manley arranged for the endangered legislator to
go to Washington after the house had approved the Manley plan and to
meet with Justice officials to argue his case for a sixty percent
black district. The legislature would not adjourn until Tuesday so
that if Justice approved Pegues' sixty percent black district, an
executive or legislative amendment could be made to reinstate it. If
Justice failed to approve it, the original Manley plan would be law
and Gov. James would sign it.
          The script for this compromise was followed carefully. The
legislature met and, over the objections of some disgruntled whites
and the Black Legislative Caucus, approved the original Manley
plan. On the weekend, Pegues flew to Washington and returned for the
session on Tuesday, June 1. On the floor the legislator plaintively
admitted, "If my amendment alone went on the bill, it would adversely
affect it." He had failed to convince Justice.
          Both houses quickly confirmed the Manley plan with dissenting votes
coming only from black legislators who didn't think the plan went far
enough in remedying the efforts of the old plan and from a handful of
whites who thought it went too far or who just didn't like the way
Manley or Justice had treated them.
          With final legislative action, activities shifted from Montgomery
to Washington and the Justice Department. Manley, Proctor, and state
lawyers flew to Washington immediately after the legislative
adjournment to put their case before the U.S. Assistant Attorney
General. A delegation of the Legislative Black Caucus followed in the
same week to ask for an objection. On Tuesday, June 8th, Justice
issued a letter approving most of the Manley plan. Full arguments
before the federal court will come late in June or July.
          
            Florida
          
          With most counties in the state not covered by the Voting Rights
Act's preclearance section, Florida has settled the primary issues of
reapportioning its congressional and state legislative districts.
          With the addition of four congressional districts in the state,
blacks had hoped vainly for a majority-black congressional district
and some gains in creating single-member, majority-black districts in
the state senate and house. Putting aside those concerns, the Florida
legislators saw the most bitter fight between the interests of
Republicans and Democrats and among several leading state legislators
who have eyed one of the new congressional seats for their own
political future.
          
            Georgia
          
          After the Justice Department's decision in April to approve
Georgia's state legislative reapportionment plan while rejecting the
congressional one, the state's new attorney general, Michael Bowers,
led the way in appealing the decision of Justice to the federal courts
in Washington. Assuring other state officials and congressmen that the
court appeal would be won in time to hold elections as usual, Bowers
got a vote of confidence from both houses of the Georgia General
Assembly, the Lt. Governor, and the Governor.
          The state argues that Justice's rejection of a fifty-seven percent
black-populated congressional district in the Atlanta area misapplies
the Voting Rights Act. The district is already fifty percent black and
the state's proposal would have increased the number of blacks in the
district by seven percentage points. Bowers says that Justice is
attempting to require Georgia's legislature to make a guaranteed black
seat of the Fifth Congressional District. The Democratic incumbent of
the Fourth District, Elliott Levitas, adds that Justice is attempting
to define him out of office by creating a district with a Republican
majority.
          The Justice Department's decision to disapprove the fifty-seven
percent majority-black district indicated that the state failed to
rebut evidence that "the line between districts number four and five
were drawn to minimize 

the voting strength" of blacks in that
area. U.S. Assistant c Attorney General Bradford Reynolds reminded
Bowers that the state senate had adopted the plan sponsored by black
state Sen. Julian Bond to create a sixty-nine percent majority-black
congressional district. Reynolds also noted that Georgia had failed to
rebut evidence that the Bond plan was rejected (after several days of
negotiations between the two houses of the General Assembly) largely
because of the state House of Representatives' determination not to
permit black voters too much power at the polls in any congressional
district. (See SOUTHERN CHANGES, April, 1982).
          Once Bowers had filed the state's appeal in Washington, several
black state legislators and citizens from Atlanta intervened to
support Justice's objection. Intervenors claimed that the proposed
fifty-seven percent black district not only has a discriminatory
purpose but also a discriminatory effect on black voting strength. The
trial starts June 28 and may last ten or fifteen days. A decision by
the federal court could come as late as the end of July.
          If Justice's actions are upheld, the federal courts will likely
take over the job of drawing an interim congressional plan for the
primary and general elections this year in order to assure that the
elections are held.
          Because time is running out, the state's attorney general attempted
in May to have Georgia's secretary of state receive filing papers from
congressional candidates for the existing districts. The federal
district court in Washington, however, blocked that attempt after the
intervenors' lawyers from the American Civil Liberties Union argued
that the state should not be allowed to proceed under congressional
plans that are unlawful. ACLU lawyer Laughlin McDonald told the court
that the state should not be permitted to use a congressional plan
until it had adopted one that was approved by Justice and the
courts. The court agreed and barred the state from proceeding with the
existing congressional districts.
          Pretrial discovery in the case indicates that key legislative
leaders in the general assembly were in fact working to keep black
voters out of control in any congressional district. Black and white
state legislators have stated in sworn testimony that the primary
discussion in the legislature on congressional redistricting was
whether a "rigger" district would be created. The chairman of the
lower house's reapportionment committee, Joe Mack Wilson, has stated,
"The only thing worse than a 'rigger' district is a Republican
district."
          Such revelations during discovery may have caused the state lawyers
to develop a highly unusual and possibly unethical practice of keeping
clients and the state's witnesses under control during
testimony. Recently it was uncovered that a lawyer in the state
attorney general's office had arranged a system of tapping a state
legislator's foot under the table during depositions whenever the
lawyer believed that the legislator's testimony was "getting out of
control."
          Both Justice and the intervenors have continued to stress that the
proposed district which Justice rejected may have had a majority-black
population but had a "fifty-four percent white voter registration."
Also, lawyers have pointed out that while legislators say they
objected to Bond's proposed district because it unnecessarily crossed
county lines and divided the metropolitan area, the proposed,
unsuccessful congressional district crossed county lines just as
much.
          
            Louisiana
          
          As state officials began leaving their offices in Baton Rouge for
Memorial Day weekend, Justice Department lawyers in Washington
informed the state's attorney general by telephone that the Louisiana
state redistricting plan had been rejected under the Voting Rights
Act.
          Members of the Legislative Black Caucus and civil rights leaders i
n New Orleans had petitioned Justice earlier to turn down the
redistricting passed by the legislature late last year. They contend
that the proposed plan is racially discriminatory, especially in New
Orleans where the number of majority-white districts increased from
seven to eight. This rearrangement was proposed despite an increase in
the percentage of blacks in New Orleans. Black leaders pointed out
that, statewide, the number of black majority districts would have
been decreased from seventeen to fourteen if the legislature's plans
had been approved by Justice.
          One alternative plan which the Black Caucus may present soon to the
legislature when it takes up reapportionment again would provide for
twenty majority-black house districts across the state.
          
            Mississippi
          
          Federal courts in Mississippi and Washington will decide in the
next several weeks if the poorest state in the nation, with almost a
forty percent black population, will have one of five congressional
districts with a majority of black voters.
          The possibility of a black congressional district was rejected by
the Mississippi Legislature late last year when it turned down a plan
by black state Sen. Henry J. Kirksey of Jackson who proposed a
sixty-five percent majority-black congressional district that centered
in the state's Delta region. On March 30 the Justice Department
objected to the legislative plan which created a forty-eight percent
black district that ran across the midsection of Mississippi from the
Delta on the west to the Alabama border on the east and a forty-five
percept black district in the southwestern corner.
          In disapproving the congressional plan, Justice noted that the
heavily black-populated Delta had been split into congressional
districts shortly after the 1965 Voting Rights Act was passed in order
to break up black Mississippians' strongest voting power. Justice
found, that in drafting reapportionment lines in 1981, Mississippi
state officials had failed to show that the rejection of alternative
proposals such as Senator Kirksey's was not racially motivated.
          By the second week of April, Mississippi had filed an 

appeal of
Justice's decision in federal court in Washington and retained Jerris
Leonard, the lawyer also handling North Carolina's redistricting case,
to present their claims that a change from an existing forty-five
percent black district in the Delta to a forty-seven percent black
district was not racially discriminatory. According to local press
reports, Mississippi also set aside a quartet of a million dollars in
order to allow its lawyers to press their case.
          A few days later, twelve blacks filed suit in federal court in
Greenville asking that a three-judge panel prohibit the state from
using the 1981 congressional plan which Justice rejected and implement
instead an interim plan with a sixty-five percent majority black Delta
district for elections this year. State officials apparently had hoped
to win their appeal in Washington or to be permitted to use a version
of their 1981 reapportionment in the June 1 primaries; however, the
court did not permit its use and instead asked for oral arguments and
briefs in order to make a decision on what plan could be used this
year.
          Blacks and some white liberals in Mississippi are also split
politically on the issue of a black Delta district. Whites fear that
the creation of a Delta district will take so many blacks from other
areas that Mississippi would have "one friendly black face and four
hostile Republicans" in its five-member congressional
delegation. Blacks respond wistfully that they must have missed
something in the last thirty years of Mississippi politics since they
have not been able to find all those white responsive, sympathetic
Democrats which such an argument assumes.
          While the Greenville court is expected to rule soon, both sides in
the litigation promise an appeal, and the final shape of the Delta
district for the November elections this year may not be decided until
late July.
          
            North Carolina
          
          Never in its history has the North Carolina legislature faced such
persisting problems in reapportioning its own houses. The general
assembly has already convened four times to draw district lines. While
the dispute has now been settled in Washington and the Justice
Department, a federal court in Raleigh will decide later in the summer
if the state must make a fifth effort.
          The latest special session on reapportionment came in late
April. The legislature convened after Justice objected for the third
time to both the house and senate lines. In its letter of objection,
Justice found that a 51.3 percent majority-black senate district in
the northeastern part of the state continued to dilute black voting
strength in an area where a 61.2 percent black district had been
proposed by the N.C. Association of Black Lawyers. In the house plan,
Justice objected to the continued submerging of black voters in
Fayetteville in a large, multi-member district of white voters. In a
county where five representatives sit in the lower house, the General
Assembly had proposed a district which it claimed contained
"eighty-four percent majority of black registered voters." In fact,
the district of almost fifty thousand people had less than four
thousand registered voters on the books because most of the residents
were military families stationed at nearby Ft. Bragg. Justice accepted
the arguments of the black plaintiffs who had challenged the
reapportionment in federal court that this majority-black district was
an illusion at best.
          Because candidates' filing dates were scheduled to begin in May,
North Carolina state officials moved quickly when Justice's actions
became known. After Jerris Leonard, the state's Washington counsel and
former assistant attorney general under Nixon, advised his clients
that Justice's objections could be met with only minor changes, the
legislature was called into special session. Within-three days the
General Assembly had approved an increase of four percentage points in
the black population of the northeastern senate district; up to 55.1
percent. In Fayetteville, a new single-member district was carved out
of both the Ft. Bragg area and some of the black-populated parts of
the City.
          Before the General Assembly adjourned, rumors spread that
U.S. Assistant Attorney General Bradford Reynolds had approved, by
telephone, the new plan with its two minor changes. The official
approval of the plan on April 30th, less than two days after the
legislature's adjournment, seemed to confirm the scuttlebutt.
          Lawyers for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) who represent black
plaintiffs in the Raleigh suit criticize Justice's decision as
providing too little protection for black voters. They point out that
the fifty-five percent black senate district has less than a majority
of blacks of voting-age population and that black registration is
probably closer to forty-three percent. They also argue that while the
Cumberland County house district may have a majority of registered
black voters, it does not have a majority of potential black
voters.
          Despite Justice's approval, the district lines for the legislature
are not yet settled. LDF lawyers contend that the legislature's
failure to create single-member districts in Charlotte, Raleigh, and
Durham, where several majority black districts could be created. will
be declared unconstitutional by the federal court when the issue comes
to trial in the summer or fall. Because North Carolina has only forty
of its one hundred counties covered by the preclearance provisions of
the Voting Rights Act, the legislature's redistricting of the major
urban centers were not reviewed by Justice. Legal. observers believe
that Justice may intervene in the federal suit in Raleigh on the side
of black plaintiffs to help challenge the redistricting of the urban
centers since they could not review it under the preclearance
provisions.
          As in other Southern states, several groups are in court fighting
reapportionment. State Republicans have had their case consolidated
with the Raleigh lawsuit. They are challenging as unlawful all
multi-member districts throughout the state. At the same time, white
citizens in Wake County--near the city of Winston-Salem--are suing the
state because it created a single-member district that split parts of
Wake into different legislative districts.
          With Justice's approval, North Carolina officials have gone forward
with their elections for the fall. Yet, 

depending on the future
evidence presented in the federal court, those plans may be only the
fifth edition in the long run of redistricting in the state.
          
            SOUTH CAROLINA
          
          After extensive negotiations between the Justice Department lawyers
and State Representative Robert Shebeen, the redistricting of the
South Carolina house came to an end in April although the state senate
has yet to take up its own reapportionment.
          Shebeen, the chairman of the state house judiciary committee, came
up with a revised plan after Justice objected to an earlier
redistricting. Shuttling back and forth from Washington for almost
four weeks, the South Carolina lawmaker came up with an acceptable
plan that created twenty-six majority-black house districts, two more
than presently exist. The gains are in majority-black districts in
Richmond County surrounding Columbia and in Florence.
          While primary elections proceeded on schedule, the biggest battle
in line-drawing may lie ahead. The state senate has sixteen
multi-member districts which elect up to five members each. The
Legislative Black Caucus, none of whose members sit in the all-white
state senate, are urging a single-member district plan that would give
black voters a better opportunity to have their vote count.
          
            TEXAS
          
          Primary elections were held in Texas in early May and June under
redistricting plans which federal courts had ordered for 1982. Before
the next congressional elections, however, the legislature must return
to Austin to draw up at least four new congressional districts around
Dallas and may choose to remap the entire state.
          Appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court went to the wire as the primary
election of May 1 approached. The decision of a three-judge federal
court panel in Texas was overturned once by the Supreme Court in early
April because the lower court had gone too far in redrawing too many
congressional districts. In April the lower court acted quickly and
revised its plan which the Supreme Court refused to overturn.
          Hispanic groups in Texas were especially disappointed in the
redistricting since they had expected a majority district in Congress
and substantial additions in both the state senate and house in
southwest Texas.
          
            VIRGINIA
          
          On April Fool's Day, the Virginia General Assembly reluctantly met
in special session and ended more than a year of entanglements over
redistricting by creating three additional majority-black districts in
the lower house.
          Civil rights and civil liberties groups who had fought the state
plan before the Justice Department and the courts expressed almost
complete satisfaction of the new plan. "We've achieved what we set out
to do," said Henry Marsh, black mayor of Richmond and lawyer for the
state NAACP. Judy Goldberg of the Virginia ACLU echoed the sentiment
by calling the plan a "99.5 percent victory." After a federal court
and Justice had given the state delegates three opportunities to draw
lawful lines, the General Assembly acknowledged that its April session
was its last chance to keep the courts out of redistricting.
          While the new reapportionment adds probably three districts where
blacks may be able to elect candidates Virginia presently has only
four blacks among the 140 members of the House and Senate. One in five
of the state's population is black.
          While black leaders and civil rights groups are pleased, white
Democrats claim that the reapportionment does more for Republicans
than for blacks. Calling reapportionment a "ghettoizing" of blacks and
a promotion of Republican districts, these Democrats argue that the
next General Assembly will be more hostile to black interests. Most
black leaders find the claims unpersuasive.
          
            This report was prepared by the staff of the Southern
Regional Council
          
        